The actuality of Aristotelian prâxis and practical reason: Keys to deliberation and prudential knowledge in regulated actions

Abstract

Within the framework of the practical problems of professional ethics in psychology, the objective is, on the one hand, to analyze the articulation between the correct statements on the regulated action, discovered in the theoretical plane of ethics, and their application in the action itself subject to categorically diverse elements and, on the other, to reflect on the type of knowledge that a competent agent must execute at the kairological moment of application. The hypothesis is that there is a primacy and a need to cultivate prudential knowledge in conjunction with knowledge of the regulations of action in order to achieve a certain competence that allows an adequate-regular application of the norm in the particular practical context of action. We will try to show, from the Aristotelian contributions, that this complex process is composed of knowing the norm (theoretical knowledge), acting competently with the case (experiential knowledge) and with oneself (prudential knowledge).