The visual perception of causal relations

Abstract

An important aspect of the Humean legacy in the context of contemporary philosophy is his skepticism regarding the possibility of perceiving or detecting causal relations in visual experience. This article will critically evaluate two important strategies that attempt to challenge this skeptical perspective by asserting that we do perceive causality. The first strategy is empirical in nature and was proposed within the scope of experimental psychology by Michotte (1963). The second strategy is based on a philosophical method of phenomenal contrast and has been defended by Siegel (2020). In what follows it will be argued that both strategies are insufficient and that they do not establish their goals. In the first case it will be argued that there are important methodological deficiencies regarding what we can legitimately conclude based on reports that contain causal expressions and it will be indicated that Michotte does not make explicit some theoretical commitments that are necessary to accept his proposal. In the second case, in addition to identifying methodological problems associated with our imaginative practices, it will be suggested that Siegel assumes excessive theoretical demands regarding the role of cognition in perceptual processing without offering independent arguments.