CAUSAL ARGUMENT, PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION AND NON-CAUSAL MODELS: CAN EXTERNIST PROPERTIES BE EXPLANATORILY RELEVANT TO BEHAVIOR?

Abstract

In this article, I examine the causal argument defended by some philosophers, who argue that
only the intrinsic or internal properties of the cognitive subject are relevant for explaining
behavior, based on the relationship between causally efficacious and explanatorily relevant
properties. Although it is commonly accepted that causally efficacious properties are
intrinsic, I will argue that the causal argument fails to fulfill its purpose. This is because
extrinsic or external properties can be equally explanatory, as the properties determining
explanatory relevance can be characterized not only in causal terms but also in non-causal
terms. Towards the end of the paper, drawing from new explanatory models emerging from
neuroscience and mathematics, I will show how non-causal models could be an interesting
alternative for explaining behavior in certain cases.